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In 2009, demand in the world’s major economies fell, relative
to its pre-crisis trend, by around US$2.5 trillion or 5% of GDP.
The ﬁnancial crisis left almost no country unscathed.  While
unprecedented policy measures allowed the world to escape a
second Great Depression, the global recovery so far has been
uneven and it remains fragile.
This article looks at the role global imbalances played in
fuelling the ﬁnancial crisis, and the importance of achieving a
rebalancing of global demand in order to foster a sustainable
recovery.  Its key message is that, in today’s highly
interconnected global economy, a top priority for national
policymakers must be to ﬁnd ways to rebalance global
demand.  That is important to ensure both (i) the level of
world demand is sufﬁcient for the world recovery to continue
and (ii) that future crises are avoided.
Imbalances contributed to the financial crisis
Since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in the
early 1970s, international monetary arrangements have
evolved into a decentralised system.  Countries are free to
make independent choices about their monetary, exchange
rate and ﬁnancial stability policies.  Greater capital mobility
has also been one of the deﬁning features of the current
regime.  In the run-up to the recent crisis, net capital ﬂows
more than doubled in less than a decade (Chart 1) and global
imbalances widened to near unprecedented levels (Chart 2).
Increased capital ﬂows can raise global output to the extent
that they seek out the most productive investment
opportunities, transferring savings from countries where the
marginal product of capital is low to countries where the
marginal product of capital is high.  But in today’s system,
some advanced economies such as the United States and the
United Kingdom have been running large and persistent
current account deﬁcits, while emerging market economies, in
particular in Asia and among oil exporters, have been running
current account surpluses.  This ‘uphill’ ﬂow of capital from
the dynamic, labour-abundant emerging economies to the
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mature advanced economies is, at least in some instances,
puzzling.  So factors other than differences in the marginal
product of capital must have been at work (Lucas (1990)).  It is
notable that the purchasers of foreign assets have been
emerging market public sectors rather than private sectors.  As
a result, there has been a more than tenfold increase in reserve
holdings over the past fifteen years.  The governments in those
economies have been playing an intermediary role, channelling
domestic saving away from the local economy and into
international capital markets.  And emerging market
economies’ asset of choice has been safe, typically sovereign
ﬁnancial assets.
These growing flow imbalances have been accompanied by
growing stock imbalances.  The US net external liability
position quadrupled in size in the course of a decade, rising to
US$3.5 trillion in 2008 (25% of GDP).  And the net external
asset positions of Japan and Germany rose by around
US$1.7 trillion and US$0.8 trillion respectively (around 35%
and 25% of 2008 GDP) over the same period, while Chinese
net external assets reached US$1.5 trillion, a third of GDP, in
2008.
What drove these net capital ﬂows ‘uphill’?  Chart 1 illustrates
that these ﬂows were associated with a decline in long-term
interest rates, pointing to either a fall in desired investment or
an increase in desired saving at the global level.  Were such
changes to occur in any given country, they would tend to
increase that country’s current account balance, leading either
to a smaller deﬁcit or a larger surplus.  But the fact that global
current account imbalances were growing over this period
indicates that these shifts in saving-investment balances
occurred in countries that were already running surpluses.
Chart 3 demonstrates that rising saving-investment
imbalances in surplus countries were driven primarily by
increased saving, rather than decreased investment.  Although
investment had been high and rising in surplus countries,
saving had been even higher, and increasing at a faster rate.  A
‘savings glut’ in surplus countries created ever-larger net
capital outﬂows that allowed the United States — and other
deﬁcit countries — to ﬁnance continued borrowing.
In an accounting sense, the increase in emerging market saving
as a share of world GDP reﬂected two factors.  Taking China as
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Chart 1 Current account imbalances and long-term
interest rates
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increased as a percentage of national disposable income from
2001 onwards.  Chart 5 shows that Chinese GDP has doubled
as a share of world GDP since 2001 — accentuating the
increase in Chinese savings as a share of world GDP.
There are three possible, interconnected, reasons why
domestic saving in emerging economies increased.  First, many
of these economies adopted a strategy of expanding
manufactured exports to create employment.  This required
maintaining highly competitive exchange rates and resulted in
a substantial accumulation of foreign exchange reserves.
Second, in the aftermath of the Asian crisis governments
decided to accumulate reserves for precautionary reasons.
And third, low levels of ﬁnancial development may have
played an important role through a variety of channels
including (i) households choosing to self-insure because of
incomplete access to domestic insurance markets
(Mendoza et al (2009));  (ii) an insufﬁcient supply of ‘safe’
ﬁnancial assets at home which encouraged emerging market
investors to accumulate ‘safe’ assets from advanced
economies’ ﬁnancial markets (Caballero et al (2008));  (iii) the
scaling back of government-provided social safety nets and
provision of health and education services, which encouraged
households to build up saving buffers (Chamon and Prasad
(2010));  and (iv) inadequate provision of ﬁnancial services,
which forced companies to retain earnings to ﬁnance future
investment.
Meanwhile, policymakers in advanced economies followed a
strategy of aiming to maintain an adequate level of overall
demand consistent with steady, low inﬂation.  In some cases,
that implied that they ran substantial current account deﬁcits.
At the time, all the economies seemed to gain:  just as the
high-saving countries created employment, the low-saving
economies enjoyed faster real consumption growth as the
price of imported manufactured goods fell.
Within their own terms, all these actions were rational.  All the
main players — countries, regulators, central banks and
commercial banks — were rationally pursuing their own self
interest.  But what made sense for each player individually did
not make sense in aggregate.  These actions had collective
consequences.
In particular, the ‘glut’ of savings helped push down on
government bond yields — Warnock and Warnock (2009), for
example, estimate that if there had been no foreign ofﬁcial
purchases of US government bonds in the year to May 2005,
the ten-year Treasury yield would have been around 80 basis
points higher.  In an attempt to maintain returns at previous
higher levels, other investors ‘searched for yield’, which
encouraged risk-taking, much of it under the guise of ‘ﬁnancial
innovation’, resulting in an underpricing of risk.  This was
evident in reduced discrimination between assets of differing
credit quality and the development of increasingly complex
financial instruments employing leverage to generate higher
returns.  Such risk-taking was possible because of inadequacies
in ﬁnancial regulation and supervision.
The pattern of growth, with the associated imbalances and
mispricing of risk, was not sustainable:  as we know only too
well, the ensuing ﬁnancial crisis threatened the entire stability
of the ﬁnancial system.  Indeed, as Chart 6 illustrates, ﬁnancial
crises have been a hallmark of the current incarnation of the
international monetary and ﬁnancial system (IMFS), with the
reappearance of global ﬁnancial instability coinciding with the
rapid increase in capital mobility.  Chart 7 shows that the
change in countries’ non-performing loan (NPL) ratios
between 2007 and 2009 and their current account balance in
2007 are correlated, though of course the direction of
causation could go both ways.  By comparison, the
relationship between the change in countries’ NPL ratios and
their banks’ capital ratios is insigniﬁcant.  Table A also shows
that relative to Bretton Woods, today’s IMFS has proven
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durable, but it has also coexisted, on average, with:  slower,
more volatile, global growth;  more frequent downturns;
higher inﬂation and inﬂation volatility;  larger current account
imbalances;  and more frequent banking crises, currency crises
and external defaults.  However, to some extent these
period-average metrics obscure signiﬁcant improvements over
the current period, with the ‘great moderation’ period
post-1990 associated with much better outcomes than those
achieved in the 1970s and 1980s.  Nevertheless, with the
important exception of inﬂation, the outcomes achieved
during the Bretton Woods period were better than those
attained since 1990.  While this does not imply causation of
course, it does suggest that better outcomes may be possible.
Indeed, the main lesson from the crisis is the need to ﬁnd
better ways of ensuring the right collective outcome.  Reforms
to ﬁnancial regulation and the structure of the banking system
need to take place in order to prevent another ﬁnancial crisis.
Many of these reforms are already under way.  Improved
ﬁnancial regulation will help to intermediate the flows
associated with global imbalances.  But we cannot expect too
much of regulation:  it may well be circumvented or diluted
over time, and there will be leakages, both across borders and
through the shadow banking system.  So the global economy
will remain vulnerable to the risks associated with imbalances
if they are not tackled at source.  That will require some way of
ensuring that countries’ policies result in a sustainable
outcome.
Rebalancing of global demand is the key to a
sustainable recovery
All countries accept that global rebalancing is necessary.  But
there is a clear difference between the ex-ante path of
adjustment desired by the surplus countries, which are faced
with the need for a structural shift away from reliance on
exports, and the ex-ante path of adjustment preferred by the
deficit countries, which are under greater pressure to reduce
the burden of debt in both private and public sectors.  Talk of
currency conflicts is a symptom of a deeper disagreement on
the appropriate time path of real adjustment.  The reason this
matters is that, since surpluses and deficits must add to zero
for the world as a whole, differences between these desired
ex-ante adjustment paths are reconciled ex post by changes in
the level of world output.  And the risk is that unless
agreement on a common path of adjustment is reached,
conflicting policies will result in that ex-post path taking place
at an undesirably low level of world output.
Today’s IMFS has become distorted.  The major surplus and
deﬁcit countries are pursuing economic strategies that are in
direct conﬂict.  And there are some innocent victims.  Those
emerging market economies which have adopted ﬂoating
currencies are now suffering from the attempts of other
countries to hold down their exchange rates, and are
experiencing uncomfortable rates of capital inﬂows and
currency appreciation.  So there is more to this issue than a
bilateral conﬂict between China and the United States.
Current exchange rate tensions illustrate the resistance to the
relative price changes that are necessary for a successful
rebalancing.  The need to act in the collective interest has yet
to be recognised, and, unless it is, it will be only a matter of
time before one or more countries resort to protectionism as
the only domestic instrument to support a necessary
rebalancing.  That could, as it did in the 1930s, lead to a
disastrous collapse in activity around the world.  Every country
would suffer ruinous consequences.  But, to borrow a phrase,
in order to be tough on protectionism, we need also to be
tough on the causes of protectionism.
So what needs to be done?  I would suggest two principles for
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disagreement about the right speed of adjustment to the real
pattern of spending.  This discussion should be informed by
countries’ ability to follow that path in a sustainable way.
Without agreement on this, policies will inevitably conﬂict.
Once broad agreement is reached, it should then be easier to
agree on the instruments of policy.  Second, in terms of policy
instruments, put on the table many potential policy measures
— not just the single issue of exchange rates.  That should
include, in addition to exchange rates, rules of the game for
controlling capital inﬂows, more efﬁcient means for countries
to self-insure, plans to raise saving in the deﬁcit countries,
structural reforms to boost demand in the surplus countries
and even the role and governance of the international ﬁnancial
institutions.
Table A Selected metrics for measuring the performance of the IMFS over time
Panel A World GDP (per capita)(a) World inflation(b)
Growth Volatility Average Volatility
Annual average Standard deviation
Per cent Coefficient of variation Per cent Percentage points
Pre-gold standard (1820–69) 0.5 – – –
Gold standard (1870–1913)(c) 1.3 1.2 0.6 3.0
Inter-war period (1925–39)(c) 1.2 3.3 0.0 4.6
Bretton Woods (1948–72)(d) 2.8 0.3 3.3 2.1
Memo:  1948–58(d) 2.7 0.4 3.1 2.9
1959–72 3.0 0.3 3.5 1.3
Current (1973–2008) 1.8 0.7 4.8 3.5
Memo:  1973–89 1.4 0.8 7.5 3.4
1990–2008 2.2 0.6 2.3 0.9
Panel B Downturns Current account imbalances
Years of negative Years of negative country GDP growth(e) Surpluses and deficits
world GDP growth
Share of period Share of period, median country
Per cent Per cent Per cent of world GDP(f)
Pre-gold standard (1820–69) – – –
Gold standard (1870–1913)(c) 7 19 2.4
Inter-war period (1925–39)(c) 21 27 1.2
Bretton Woods (1948–72)(d) 0 4 0.8
Memo:  1948–58(d) 00 0 . 8
1959–72 0 0 0.8
Current (1973–2008) 0 13 2.2
Memo:  1973–89 0 18 1.6
1990–2008 0 11 2.8
Panel C Incidence of crises
Banking crises(g) Currency crises(h) External default(i)
Number per year Number per year Number per year
Pre-gold standard (1820–69) 0.6 – 0.7
Gold standard (1870–1913)(j) 1.3 0.6 0.9
Inter-war period (1925–39) 2.1 1.7 1.5
Bretton Woods (1948–72) 0.1 1.7 0.7
Memo:  1948–58 0.0 1.4 0.3
1959–72 0.1 1.9 1.1
Current (1973–2009) 2.6 3.7 1.3
Memo:  1973–89 2.2 5.4 1.8
1990–2009 3.0 2.4 0.8
Sources:  Bordo et al (2001), Global Financial Data, Hutchison and Noy (2006), IMF World Economic Outlook,Maddison (2006) updated data are available from www.ggdc.net/MADDISON/oriindex.htm, Mecagni et al (2009),
Reinhart (2010), Taylor (2002) and Bank calculations.
(a) Denominated in constant international dollars, as deﬁned by Maddison (2006).
(b) Nominal GDP-weighted average of twelve countries.
(c) Where world-level data are unavailable, a subset of reporting countries is used.
(d) World GDP data begin in 1950.
(e) Sample of current G20 countries (including EU countries), where data available.
(f) Sum of absolute values of surpluses and deﬁcits.  Based on available data for a sample of G20 and EU countries.
(g) Based on a sample of 56 countries, using data based on methodology developed by Bordo et al (2001).
(h) Based on a sample of 56 countries, using data based on methodology developed by Bordo et al (2001) and supplemented by Reinhart (2010), Mecagni et al (2009) and Hutchison and Noy (2006).
(i) Based on a sample of 45 countries.  External defaults as deﬁned by Reinhart (2010).
(j) Currency crises data begin in 1880.48 Quarterly Bulletin  2011 Q1
What is needed now is a ‘grand bargain’ among the major
players in the world economy.  A bargain that recognises the
beneﬁts of compromise on the real path of economic
adjustment in order to avoid the damaging consequences of a
move towards protectionism.  Exchange rates will have to be
part of such a bargain, but they logically follow a higher level
agreement on rebalancing and sustaining a high level of world
demand.
A natural forum in which to strike a bargain is the G20
Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth.  So
far, the process has failed to achieve a move to a better
outcome.  If we cannot achieve co-operation voluntarily then a
more rules-based automatic system may need to be
considered to restore global demand and to maintain future
global economic and ﬁnancial stability.
Global imbalances contributed to the ﬁnancial crisis and a
rebalancing of global demand is the key to a sustainable
recovery.  While ﬁnancial regulation will help to intermediate
the ﬂows associated with global imbalances, it has limitations.
If we, collectively, do not deal with these problems at best we
will have a weak world recovery and at worst we will sow the
seeds of the next ﬁnancial crisis.  It is in our hands to avoid
both those outcomes.
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